In this paper, I develop a career concerns model of government policy choice within a dynamic optimal stopping framework to predict the degree of surfing (opportunistic timing) and manipulation (politically motivated economic intervention) under alternate institutional structures and voter characteristics. Among other results, I find that the likelihood of opportunistic elections rises with exogenous economic performance, with longer maximum term lengths, with future electoral uncertainty, and with economic volatility but diminishes in the value of office-holding; manipulation increases with the maximum term length and with the value of office-holding but decreases with exogenous economic performance and with economic volatility. The model suggests that single-party governments should be highly opportunistic in calling elections and that countries that allow opportunistic election timing should experience less economically distortionary political intervention than their fixed-timing counterparts.
scholar (Suzuki 1992) has found that the public systematically raises welfare expectations prior to elections; academics match this interest with a steady flow of political business cycle models -initially with adaptive expectations, later with rational expectations -and empirical tests (cf., Alesina, Roubini, Cohen 1997; Drazen 2000, ch. 7) . It is incontrovertible that the public and many academics believe that governments gain electoral advantage from both activities, surfing and manipulation. Yet, despite the obvious possibilities for surfing and manipulation to influence each other, ever since Nordhaus (1975) first formalized the political business cycle and assumed fixed election timing, researchers have analyzed them in isolation from each other.
Beginning with Ito and Park's (1988) seminal paper, a wave of studies began to bridge this separation by showing pre-election economic manipulation to be considerably muted in several countries that permit endogenous election calling (e.g., Cargill and Hutchinson 1991; Chowdurry 1993; Ito 1990) . 2 This predominantly empirical literature offered a new, but not the only, explanation for the puzzling absence of political business cycles around the world (cf. Alesina, Roubini, Cohen 1997) . Why should governments engage in distortionary and unreliable macroeconomic manipulation when the simpler and non-distortionary act of election calling can achieve the same electoral end? Other observers of the surprising absence of political business cycles focused on other explanations such as the difficulty of triggering macroeconomic booms prior to elections (e.g., Lewis-Beck 1988) or the rational expectations of voters (e.g., Cukierman and Meltzer 1986; Person and Tabellini 1990; Rogoff 1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988) . 3, 4 Researchers, left with a strong incentive for governments to manipulate the economyvoters, after all, punish governments for poor economic performance -but scant evidence of cycles in macroeconomic aggregates, turned their attention to a finer-grained instrument: cycles in fiscal balances. The intuition is simple: it is easier for governments to manipulate fiscal components to target electorally important constituencies and signal competence to rational voters (Rogoff 1990) than to engineer timely improvements in output or other macroeconomic aggregates. Yet again, however, empirics raised a new puzzle: "political budget cycles" are rarely found in developed countries (Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1992) , emerging instead primarily in the developing world. This may be attributable to weaker institutions and stronger governments (Schuknecht 1996) or to lower audience costs of manipulation (Gonzalez 1999) in less developed countries. I argue that it is also attributable to the preponderance of endogenous election timing in developed countries, specifically the OECD. Of the 24 OECD member countries in 1990, only Norway, Switzerland, and the United States fully preclude early elections. 5 Opportunistic election timing matters for explaining the absence of politicaleconomic cycles, regardless of whether they are in fiscal balances or macroeconomic aggregates. Surprisingly, however, after the initial burst of interest in the moderating influence of surfing on manipulation, the field stalled. 6 Diminishing marginal returns to demonstrating the same effect in additional countries and the absence of testable theories of how institutions affect surfing and manipulation combined to dampen interest. I seek here to redress this problem by developing an explicit model with empirically testable predictions. To be precise, I embed a career concerns model of government policy choice within a dynamic optimal stopping framework to predict the degree of surfing and manipulation under alternate institutional, governmental, and constituency features.
Among other results, I find that the likelihood of early elections rises with the variance of exogenous shocks to voters' welfare, 7 with longer constitutional inter-election periods (CIEP), and with uncertainty about the future, but diminishes with the value of officeholding; manipulation decreases in the variance of welfare shocks but increases with the CIEP and with the value of office-holding; and as surfing is increasing in welfare shocks but manipulation decreasing, surfing effectively substitutes for manipulation.
These results are strongly prescriptive for institutional engineering and suggest possible unintended consequences for certain political and constitutional arrangements.
Consider, for example, how increasing international economic integration might have notably different effects on politics in endogenous timing and fixed-timing countries. As both monetary and fiscal intervention in the economy become increasingly constrained by economic and political integration, governments able to time their elections strategically should enjoy an electoral advantage relative to their fixed-timing peers.
Those governments with the fewest institutional and political barriers to opportunistic election timing, the smallest most volatile economies, and the longest CIEPs, should enjoy the greatest advantage in their reelection campaigns. Where manipulation is least constrained and economic performance most volatile -primarily in the less economically integrated developing world -it is the electorate that may gain the most from opportunistic election timing. Those states that least impede the strategic timing of elections, primarily parliamentary democracies with long maximum terms, should experience less pre-election manipulation and concomitantly less distortion in the postelection economy.
A second goal of this paper is to improve the understanding of opportunistic election timing itself by replicating for majority governments what Lupia and Strom's (1995) and Diermeier and Stevenson's (2000) coalition bargaining models have done for the study of government termination under coalition governments. By making coalition bargaining explicit, they make dissolution and elections -whether opportunistic of involuntary -a consequence of the strategic interaction of coalition members rather than the vaguely epidemiological process that dominated earlier government duration literature. 8 After all, as Grofman and Roozendaal (1994) once commented, it is the choices of actors within circumstances created by exogenous shocks that bring cabinets down. Election timing by majority governments is considerably simpler than dynamic coalition bargaining but much can still be gained by an explicit consideration of the actors' choices within circumstances created by exogenous shocks. Single-party governments, for example, maximize both the duration of the current term and the probability of reelection, not, as the traditional government duration literature assumes, just time in office. I model this trade-off between extending the current term and winning another as a dynamic optimization problem. This is not the first model of strategic election timing -signaling games by Terrones (1989) and Smith (1996) find equilibria on early elections and no early elections, respectively, 9 and dynamic programming models by Balke (1990) and Ito (1990) 
The Basic Model
Election timing is quintessentially a problem of optimization under uncertainty.
The incumbent government assesses electoral conditions in each period of its term and decides whether to call an election or to proceed to the next period, not knowing what that period holds. Opportune timing can increase both the probability of electoral victory and legislative efficacy through greater seat share but also effectively stops (i.e., resets) the game. Thus, election timing is fundamentally a finite-horizon optimal stopping problem. The government has a fixed number of periods in which to call an election before one is imposed and therefore times the election to coincide with the most electorally advantageous circumstances.
Recognizing election timing as an optimal stopping problem allows one to model a government's dynamic decision process explicitly. Dynamic programming techniques, as explained below, permit current-period options to be repeatedly compared to the expected value of future opportunities. Although the unknown values of several parameters prevent us from predicting the magnitude of different variables' effects on the probability of elections in this model, it is nevertheless possible to predict the sign of that effect.
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Imagine for now the simplest possible arrangement: voters have no memory of previous periods; the government's reelection probability, p, in each period t∈{1,2,3,…,τ}, is strictly increasing in the random state variable, µ, distributed, for simplicity, uniformly with density ζ; each draw of µ t is independent of others; the value of office-holding is constant over time; and governments simply maximize their chance of re-election, by timing elections to coincide with the highest µ t that they believe will occur in their term.
Given that the government cannot see future states, how does it determine that the current state is the best that they will likely see before their term expires? The government knows the distribution from which µ is drawn and, as in any stationary
Markov decision problem, plays a strategy to maximize their payoff: call an election only if the current state exceeds the best expected future state. Assuming optimizing behavior in each future period allows us to calculate the government's expected future state via backwards induction. Thus, for example, in the penultimate period, τ-1, the government's expected state in the subsequent and final period, E τ-1 (µ τ ), is simply the expected value of the random variable µ, µ ~ U[1 -1/(2ζ), 1 + 1/(2ζ)], i.e. 1. In this penultimate period the government will call an election if the current state of the country, µ τ-1 , is greater than the expected future state, E τ-1 (µ τ ) = 1. This logic is then extended to the preceding period, τ-2. The expected state from continuing from τ-2 to τ-1 is simply the value of playing an optimal strategy at τ-1, i.e., the average expected state from τ-1's two possible outcomes over all possible values of µ: 1) continuing to the final period if
Expressed more succinctly, the government's decision at each t solves the program which implies the value of playing an optimal strategy at t is
or, more explicitly,
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(1.2)
Thus the expected state from playing an optimal strategy can be calculated at any period and the expected value of continuing is just the value of an optimal strategy in the subsequent period.
12 Since E(µ t+1 ), the expected utility of continuing in office, is a monotonically decreasing function of time, converging to E(µ), i.e. unity, in the penultimate period, it is least likely that current-period circumstances will exceed the expected future circumstances at the beginning of a term. As remaining tenure wanes, however, the expected future state steadily declines thereby increasing the probability that a current period random draw of µ will exceed it and trigger an election. 
Governments, however, derive utility from many time-dependent actions in office not just from reelection per se. In this context, election to office becomes only a necessary condition: governments maximize their reelection probabilities in order to extend their time in office, but must trade off a probability-weighted new term against the remainder of their current term. Calling an election too soon costs the government the utility from the remainder of the current term, waiting too long reduces the chances of another favorable period occurring before mandatory dissolution. Thus a rational incumbent attempts to call elections in the last best period possible.
When utility comes from office-holding, the incumbent's decision becomes
Each period in office the government gains one unit of utility -consider this an ego rent, R -and receives new information about the current state of the country. The rational office-seeking incumbent continues in office until the expected utility of calling an election exceeds the expected utility of continuing in office, knowing that future elections may arrive under less fortunate circumstances. I represent λ, the value of continuing, as
( 1.4) The second term of the equation, (τ-t)R, captures the remaining utility in the current term in office and shrinks as the term progresses, providing a diminishing incentive to forego favorable election opportunities. τ is the maximum term length in periods and t represents the current period.
The first term of equation (1.4) represents the other important element in determining election timing: the expected value of calling an election in the future.
When incumbents expect favorable circumstances for an election in the future, it is easier to forego current opportunities. More precisely, the expected value of a future election is the product of the reelection probability generated by expected future state p(E(µ t+1 )) and the utility of a new term in office, τR, appropriately time discounted.
Against this expected value of continuing, politicians must weigh the utility of calling elections. In its most basic form the expected utility of elections in any period is
simply the maximum length of another term weighted by current period reelection probability, p(µ t ).
Voters
Until now, the government's reelection probably has simply been defined as a function of the state variable without explicit consideration of how voters form their preferences. I now make the voters' preference mechanism explicit with respect to economic welfare. I redefine the state variable µ as a stochastic shock to the economy to generate a tractable model with budget constraints that can later trade off economic manipulation and election timing. This is not to claim that non-economic event do not affect election timing -they do -but simply to restrict this model to ceteris paribus effects of the economy.
Adopting a career-concerns framework (Holström 1982; Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2000) positing asymmetric information, I can now make the voters' selection process -and hence the government's reelection probability calculation -explicit. Voters hold governments accountable for economic performance but, unable to observe government competence directly, infer it from the provision of public goods. More explicitly, suppose that government provision of public goods, g t , is
constrained by g t = z t (Ty + s t ) where T represents the tax rate 14 , y income, z t aggregate two-period economic shocks, and s t a hidden and distorting tax that shifts resources from the future to the present, improving current period welfare at the cost of the equivalent amount plus negative economic distortions, V(s), in the subsequent period. Knowing that more competent governments provide more public goods, but impotent to influence µ, governments are tempted to create the appearance of greater competence by increasing s.
While voters can immediately observe g, T, and y, both z' t and s' t remain at least partially unobservable (primes indicate inferred variables). Voters therefore infer overall government competence as z' t = g t /(Ty + s' t ). Past aggregate competence, z t-1 , is both observable and related to present competence but the current period's competence cannot be observed directly. Imagine aggregate competence, z t , as the sum of the random and serially uncorrelated economic shock variable µ over the present and immediately preceding period, z t = µ t-1 + µ t , where µ t-1 is observed by government and voters alike but knowledge of µ t is reserved for the government. Given that the random variable µ is distributed uniformly with mean 1 and density ζ, µ~U[1-1/(2ζ), 1+1/(2ζ)], voters choose the government if its inferred current competence µ' t is greater than the opposition's expected competence, E(µ o ) = 1. 15, 16 Thus, the government's reelection probability is
simply the probability that its inferred current competence exceeds the opposition's expected competence. More explicitly, 6) or, reexpressing g t and rearranging, Voters, therefore, may be fully rational or boundedly rational, depending on the cost to them of the government influencing the economic variable from which they infer competence. In this model the government can only signal competence by increasing public goods provision, g, either though opportune timing (hence a higher z) or by increasing s, a hidden and distortionary tax on the future. Although exogenous to the model, if the value to the voters of the competence signal inferred from g exceeds the time-discounted future distortionary effects of s, then the voters are fully rational in much the same way they are in rational political budget cycle models (e.g., Rogoff 1990 
Optimal Manipulation
As the model is currently constituted, reelection-minded governments should simply increase economic manipulation until their probability of reelection approaches unity, engendering an economically destructive vicious cycle as expectations also adjust upwards. As voters do not witness the distortionary effects of s until after the election, governments should consistently inflate the economy beyond expectations to ensure victory.
However, a government that cares about voter welfare or, more cynically, its own reputation and future reelection bids, will avoid this corner solution by trading off reelection probability and voter welfare. Pre-election manipulation induces post-election penance in the form of 1) lower government revenue, 2) lower public goods provision as g t+1 =z t+1 (Ty-s t ), and 3) negative distortionary effects, V(s t ), such that (1.10) w t+1 = y(1-T) -V t+1 (s t ) + g t+1.
In short, governmental sins of the past revisit the voters' present as the distortionary effects of previous period manipulation and lower levels of public goods as the government repays election period obligations. Incumbents thus maximizes a combination of reelection conditional utility and voter welfare in choosing the optimal level of economic manipulation, ( (1.14)
With a little help from the Implicit Function Theorem, one can now see that optimal manipulation is decreasing in competence:
(1.15) Governments, concerned with their legacies and constituents' welfare, are not willing to induce too severe a post-election economic distortion in return for marginal increase in reelection probability. While strong incentives exist to manipulate the economy for electoral gain in election periods, the degree of such intervention is tempered by concerns about economic repercussions.
Comparative Statics
So what does this mean for election timing? The comparative statics of this model bear strong implications for optimal election timing. Understanding the effect of τ, R, ζ, µ, and δ on p has -as I show below -direct implications for optimal timing, and consequently institutional design. We will also see that opportunistic timing, in turn, has its own implications, especially in relation to manipulation. Proposition: Let E(t elec ) be the expected period in which elections are called under optimal election timing. Then E(t elec ) is strictly decreasing in
Given (1.8), any increase in E(p t ), the central component in calling, yields a greater increase in E(p t+1 ), the primary component in continuing, in all periods prior to τ-1. The expected value of playing an optimal strategy over multiple future periods is greater than the (expected) value of the single draw in the current period, so any increase in single draw E(p t ) is amplified in E(p t+1 ). This implies that the value of continuing increases in E(p t ) at a faster rate than the value of election calling, yet as calling is immediate and continuing deferred, only the latter is time discounted. As long as a government discounts the future at a rate sufficient to offset the rate at which E(p t+1 ) surpasses E(p t ),
Given that e -δ(τ-t) E(p t+1 )/E(p t ) < 1 obtains, it is now possible to draw a number of conclusions about the effect of several societal and institutional features on election timing and manipulation. Proposition One implies that opportunistic timing increases (i.e., λ-n decreases) in:
1. µ t . Governments cannot influence exogenous economic conditions (short of distortionary manipulation) but they are able call elections to correspond with opportune circumstances. Timing elections to correspond better economy (greater µ) increases public goods provision, the electorate's estimate of government competence, and the incumbent's current period reelection probability. Opportunistic elections should therefore be more likely in periods of exceptionally strong economic performance.
2.
δ. The more a government discounts the future, the more λ, the value of continuing, is reduced relative to n, calling. This suggests that minority governments or governments with narrow majorities or low party disciple -that is, any government with low expectations of staying in power for long -should be more inclined to opportunistic timing.
3.
τ. Longer maximum terms postpone the expected election period, t elec , but increase opportunistic election calling by decreasing λ-n. The prior occurs because the remaining term sacrificed by early elections increases; the latter occurs because longer terms raise the value of a given term thereby invoking proposition one. Opportunistic election calling should therefore be more common in states with longer maximum terms.
But opportunistic timing decreases in 4. R. The greater the value of office-holding, the less opportunistic the government. An increase in the value of office-holding (fewer checks on power, weaker opposition, etc.) is reduced by reelection uncertainty in the calling function common to λ and n but is unmodified in the remainder of the present term unique to λ.
5.
ζ. The greater the density of µ, the lower the variance of µ, the lower the probability of a draw of µ t sufficiently above E(µ) for n to exceed λ. Finally, this paper provides a central role for strategic decision making in research on government termination. Traditional empirical research on government termination, constrained by the limits of discrete time and hazard models, has largely ignored strategic behavior (e.g., Warwick 1994) . Formal work has incorporated strategic behavior but has been either numeric (e.g., Balke 1990) or not fully dynamic (e.g., Lupia and Strom 1995) .
The present dynamic stochastic model, together with advances in the estimation of dynamic stochastic discrete choice models (e.g., Keane and Wolpin 1994) should offer new opportunities for predicting and estimating the effects of various political, institutional, and economic arrangements on surfing and manipulation. not the equilibrium, of his signaling model. British governments call early elections but, because early elections signal government foreknowledge of imminent downturns, suffer a penalty for doing so. The penalty, however, is not sufficient to preclude opportunistic election calling. The stochastic model presented here predicts that governments call elections during exceptionally large expansions unlikely to recur in the same term. This is often, but not always, observationally equivalent to calling elections before downturns. 10 Estimating discrete choice dynamic programming parameters is often possible, however, and has received considerable attention from some econometricians and labor economists. Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) offer a survey of several approaches and newer techniques (e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1994) continue to emerge. In the case of this paper, one possibility might be to employ polling data in place of the current stochastic economic shocks.
11 Keep in mind the distinction between E(µ) and E(µ t ): the former is simply the expected value of a single draw from the state variable (µ) distribution whereas the latter is the expected utility of playing an optimal strategy at t.
12 Equations (1.1) and (1.2) depend on the Bellman optimality equation. See Sundaram (1996 Sundaram ( [1999 , p. 274) for an explanation of how a decision rule constitutes an optimal strategy in finite horizon dynamic programming. See Kreps (1990, Appendix 2.2) for a mathematically similar optimal stopping example. 13 The expected utility of continuing declines with time because the number of future draws decreases with time. This process, to borrow from the extensive optimal search and stopping applications in labor economics, is akin to that faced by a job seeker with a fixed number of sequential job offers with salaries drawn from the same distribution. At the final offer the job seeker will have to accepted the expected value of a single draw from the distribution, i.e., its mean. The penultimate offer will therefore only be accepted if it exceeds the expected value of the final offer, and so on backwards to the first offer. 20 The condition that e -δ(τ-t) E(p t+1 )/E(p t ) < 1 is very reasonable. For example, even near the end of a term where dE(p t+1 )/dE(p t ) is greatest and the exponential discounting slightest, given p~U[1/4,3/4] and three remaining periods prior to mandatory elections, any δ greater than .02 suffices to ensure that an increase in E(p) will raise the utility of calling more than continuing. In the preceding period, τ-4, the discount threshold falls to .018, and by the first period of a sixty period term, think of monthly periods in a five year term, any value of δ greater than .002 will ensure that e -δ(τ-t) E(p t+1 )/E(p t ) < 1 and therefore d(λ-n)/dE(p) < 0. Thus, anything that raises E(p t ) yields more opportunistic election calling and earlier elections if e -δ(τ-t) E(p t+1 )/E(p t ) < 1 and reduces opportunistic election calling and extends expected government tenure if e -δ(τ-t) E(p t+1 )/E(p t ) > 1.
